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Abstract
Ad and tracking blocking extensions are popular tools for
improving web performance, privacy and aesthetics. Content
blocking extensions typically rely on filter lists to decide
whether a web request is associated with tracking or advertis-
ing, and so should be blocked. Millions of web users rely on
filter lists to protect their privacy and improve their browsing
experience.
Despite their importance, the growth and health of filter lists
are poorly understood. Filter lists are maintained by a small
number of contributors, who use a variety of undocumented
heuristics to determine what rules should be included. Lists
quickly accumulate rules, and rules are rarely removed. As a
result, users’ browsing experiences are degraded as the num-
ber of stale, dead or otherwise not useful rules increasingly
dwarf the number of useful rules, with no attenuating benefit.
An accumulation of “dead weight” rules also makes it difficult
to apply filter lists on resource-limited mobile devices.
This paper improves the understanding of crowdsourced fil-
ter lists by studying EasyList, the most popular filter list. We
find that EasyList has grown from several hundred rules, to
well over 60,000 rules, during its 9-year history. We measure
how EasyList affects web browsing by applying EasyList to
a sample of 10,000 websites. We find that 90.16% of the re-
source blocking rules in EasyList provide no benefit to users
in common browsing scenarios. We further use our changes
in EasyList application rates to provide a taxonomy of the
ways advertisers evade EasyList rules. Finally, we propose op-
timizations for popular ad-blocking tools, that allow EasyList
to be applied on performance constrained mobile devices, and
improve desktop performance by 62.5%, while preserving
over 99% of blocking coverage.
1 Introduction
As the web has become more popular as a platform for infor-
mation and application delivery, users have looked for ways to
improve the privacy and performance of their browsing. Such
efforts include popup blockers, hosts.txt files that black-
hole suspect domains, and privacy-preserving proxies (like
Privoxy 1) that filter unwanted content. Currently, the most
popular filtering tools are ad-blocking browser extensions,
which determine whether to fetch a web resource based on its
URL. The most popular ad-blocking extensions are Adblock
Plus 2, uBlock Origin 3 and Ghostery 4, all of which use filter
lists to block unwanted web resources.
Filter lists play a large and growing role in making the web
pleasant and useful. Studies have estimated that filter lists
save users between 13 and 34% of network data, decreasing
the time and resources needed to load websites [4, 18]. Oth-
ers, such as Merzdovnik et al. [16] and Gervais et al. [5],
have shown that filter lists are important for protecting
users’ privacy and security online. Users rely on these tools
to protect themselves from coin mining attacks, drive-by-
downloads [12, 24] and click-jacking attacks, among many
others.
Though filter lists are important to the modern web, their
construction is largely ad hoc and unstructured. The most
popular filter lists—EasyList, EasyPrivacy, and Fanboy’s An-
noyance List—are maintained by either a small number of
privacy activists, or crowdsourced over a large number of the
same. The success of these lists is clear and demonstrated by
their popularity. Intuitively, more contributors adding more
filter rules to these lists provide better coverage to users.
However, the dramatic growth of filter lists carries a down-
side in the form of requiring ever greater resources for en-
forcement. Currently, the size and trajectory of this cost are
not well understood. We find that new rules are added to
popular filter lists 1.7 times more often than old rules are
removed. This suggests the possibility that lists accumulate
“dead” rules over time, either as advertisers adapt to avoid
being blocked, or site popularity shifts and new sites come
to users’ attention. As a result, the cost of enforcing such
1http://www.privoxy.org/
2https://adblockplus.org/
3https://github.com/gorhill/uBlock
4https://www.ghostery.com
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lists grows over time, while the usefulness of the lists may
be constant or negatively trending. Understanding the trajec-
tories of both the costs and benefits of these crowdsourced
lists is therefore important to maintain their usefulness to web
privacy, security and efficiency.
This work improves the understanding of the efficiency and
trajectory of crowdsourced filter lists through an empirical,
longitudinal study. Our methodology allows us to identify
which rules are useful, and which are “dead weight” in com-
mon browsing scenarios. We also demonstrate two practical
applications of these findings: first in optimally shrinking fil-
ter lists so that they can be deployed on resource-constrained
mobile devices, and second, with a novel method for applying
filter list rules on desktops, which performs 62.5% faster than
the current, most popular filtering tool, while providing nearly
identical protections to users.
Research questions. For two months, we applied every day
an up-to-date version of EasyList to 10,000 websites, compris-
ing both the 5K most popular sites on the web and a sampling
of the less-popular tail. We aimed to answer the following
research questions:
1. What is the growth rate of EasyList, measured by the
number of rules?
2. What is the change in the number of active rules (and
rule “matches”) in EasyList?
3. Does the utility of a rule decrease over time?
4. What proportion of rules are useful in common browsing
scenarios?
5. Do websites try to stealthily bypass new ad-blocking
rules, and if so, how?
6. What is the performance cost of "stale" filter rules to
users of popular ad-blocking tools?
Contributions. In answering these questions, we make the
following primary contributions:
1. EasyList over time: we present a 9-year historical anal-
ysis of EasyList to understand the lifetime, insertion and
deletion patterns of new rules in the list.
2. EasyList applied to the web: we present an analysis of
the usefulness of each rule in EasyList by applying Ea-
syList to 10,000 websites every day for over two months.
3. Advertiser reactions: we document how frequently ad-
vertisers change URLs to evade EasyList rules in our
dataset and provide a taxonomy of evasion strategies.
4. Faster blocking strategies: we propose optimizations,
based on the above findings, to make applying EasyList
performant on mobile devices, and 62.5% faster on desk-
top environments, while maintaining over 99% of cover-
age.
Paper organization. The remainder of this paper is organized
as follows. Sections 2 and 7 provides a brief background about
tracking and ad-blockers as well as a discussion of the related
work. Section 3 presents a 9-year analysis of EasyList’s evo-
lution. Section 4 presents how EasyList rules are applied on
websites. Section 5 studies how our findings can improve ad-
blocking applications on iOS and proposes two new blocking
strategies to process requests faster. Finally, in Section 6 we
present the limitations, and we conclude the paper in Sec-
tion 8.
2 Background
Online tracking. Tracking is the act of third parties viewing,
or being able to learn about, a users’ first-party interactions.
Prior work [2,11,23] has shown that the number of third-party
resources included in typical websites has been increasing
for a long time. Websites include these resources for many
reasons, including monetizing their website with advertising
scripts, analyzing the behavior of their users using analytics
services such as Google analytics or Hotjar, and increasing
their audience with social widgets such as the Facebook share
button or Twitter retweet button.
While third-party resources may benefit the site operator,
they often work against the interest of web users. Third-party
resources can harm users’ online privacy, both accidentally
and intentionally. This is particularly true regarding tracking
scripts. Advertisers use such tracking tools as part of behav-
ioral advertising strategies to collect as much information as
possible about the kinds of pages users visit, user locations,
and other highly identifying characteristics.
Defenses against tracking. Web users, privacy activists, and
researchers have responded to tracking and advertising con-
cerns by developing ad and tracker blocking tools. Most pop-
ularly these take the form of browser extensions, such as
Ghostery or Privacy badger.5 These tools share the goal of
blocking web resources that are not useful to users, but differ
in the type of resources they target. Some block advertising,
others block trackers, malware or phishing. These tools are
popular and growing in adoption [15]. A report by Mozilla
stated that in September 2018, four out of the 10 most pop-
ular browser extensions on Firefox were either ad-blockers
or tracker blockers. Adblock Plus, the most popular of all
browser extension, was used by 9% of all Firefox users 6.
Ad and tracking blockers operate at different parts of the
web stack.
• DNS blocking relies on a hosts file containing ad-
dresses of domains or sub-domains to block. This ap-
proach can block requests with domain or sub-domain
granularity, but cannot block specific URLs. Examples
5https://www.eff.org/fr/node/99095
6https://data.firefox.com/dashboard/usage-behavior
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of domain-blocking tools include Peter Lowe’s list 7 and
MVPS hosts 8.
• Privacy proxies protect users by standing between the
client and the rest of the internet, and filtering out unde-
sirable content before it reaches the client. Privoxy is a
popular example of an intercepting proxy.
• Web browsers can attempt to prevent tracking, either
through browser extensions or as part of the browser
directly. These tools examine network requests and page
renderings, and use a variety of strategies to identify
unwanted resources. Some tools, such as Privacy Badger
use a learning-based approach, while most others use
filter lists like EasyList 9 or EasyPrivacy 10.
EasyList. EasyList, the most popular filter list for blocking
advertising, was created in 2005 by Rick Petnel. It has been
maintained on Github 11 since November 2009. EasyList is
primarily used in ad-blocking extensions such as Adblock
Plus, uBlock origin and Adblock, and has been integrated into
privacy oriented web browsers12. Tools also exist to convert
EasyList formats to other privacy tools, like Privoxy 13,
EasyList consists of tens-of-thousands of rules describing
web resources that should be blocked or hidden during display.
The format also includes syntax for describing exceptions to
more general rules. EasyList uses a syntax similar to regular
expressions, allowing authors to generalize on patterns used
in URLs.
EasyList provides two categories of benefit to users. First,
EasyList describes URLs that should be blocked, or never
fetched, in the browser. Second, EasyList describes page el-
ements that should be hidden at rendering time. These rules
are useful when blocking at the network layer is not possible.
Examples of such cases include:
• Native ads, that are directly integrated into the HTML
code of the main page.
• Merging ad and tracking resources with other important
files required to make the website work.
• URL obfuscation techniques, which make it difficult to
narrowly identify ad and tracking related resources.
Element hiding rules can improve the user experience by
hiding unwanted page contents, but cannot provide the perfor-
mance and privacy improvements that network layer blocking
provides. There are three types of rules in EasyList:
7http://pgl.yoyo.org/adservers/
8http://winhelp2002.mvps.org/hosts.htm
9https://easylist.to/pages/about.html
10https://easylist.to/easylist/easyprivacy.txt
11https://github.com/easylist/easylist
12https://brave.com/
13https://projects.zubr.me/wiki/adblock2privoxy
Element rules
44.1%
Exception rules
8.6%
Network rules
47.3%
Figure 1: Composition of EasyList
1. Network rules, that identify URLs of requests that
should be blocked.
2. Element rules, that indicate HTML elements that
should be hidden.
3. Exception rules, that contradict network rules by explic-
itly specifying URLs that should not be blocked, even
though they match a network rule.
Figure 1 shows the constitution of EasyList in February 2019.
Of the 71,217 rules making up EasyList, 33,703 (47.3%) were
network rules , 6,125 (8.6%) were exception rules, and 31,389
(44.1%) were element rules.
3 Composition of EasyList Over Time
This section measures how EasyList has evolved over its 9-
year history, through an analysis of project’s public commit
history. The section proceeds by first detailing our measure-
ment methodology, along with our findings that EasyList has
grown to comprise nearly 70,000 rules and that it is primarily
maintained by a very small number of people. The section
concludes by showing that most rules stay more than 3.8
years in EasyList before they are removed, suggesting a huge
accumulation of unused rules.
3.1 Methodology
EasyList is maintained in a public repository on GitHub. We
use GitPython 14, a popular Python library, to measure com-
mit patterns and authors in the EasyList repository over the
project’s 9-year history.
14https://gitpython.readthedocs.io/en/stable/index.html
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For every commit in the EasyList repository, we record the
author of the commit, as well as the type and number of rules
modified in the commit.
Our measurements of EasyList’s history were conducted as
followed. First, we group commits by day. We then checkout
each day’s worth of commits, and measure which rules have
been added and removed since the previous day. We use this
per-day batching technique to avoid artifacts introduced by
git diff, which we found causes over-estimations of the
number of rules changed between commits.
Accounting for changes in repository structure. The struc-
ture of the EasyList repository has changed several times
over the project’s history. At different times, the list has been
maintained in one file or several files. The repository has also
included other distinct-but-related projects, such as EasyPri-
vacy. We use the following heuristics to attribute rules in the
repository to EasyList.
On days when the repository consists of a single file called
easylist.txt, we check to see if the file contains references
(e.g. URLs or file paths in the repo) to lists hosted elsewhere
or contains only filter rules. When the easylist.txt file con-
tains references to other lists, we treat EasyList as the union of
all rules in all referenced external lists. When easylist.txt
contains only filter rules, we treat EasyList as the content of
the easylist.txt file.
When the repository consists of anything other than a single
easylist.txt file, we consider EasyList to be the content
of all the files matching the following regular expression
’easylist_*.txt’ and that are located in the main directory
or in a directory called easylist.
3.2 Results
Rules inserted and removed. Figure 2 presents the change
in the size of EasyList over time. It shows the cumulative
number of rules inserted, removed, and present in the list over
nine years. Rules are added to the list faster than they are
removed, causing EasyList to grow larger over time. Over a 9-
year period, 124,615 rules were inserted and 52,146 removed,
resulting in an increase of 72,469 rules. EasyList’s growth
is mostly linear. One exception is the sharp change in 2013,
when “Fanboy’s list”, another popular filter list, was merged
into EasyList.
Modification frequency. We analyzed the distribution of the
time between two commits in EasyList and observed that
EasyList is frequently modified, with a median time between
commits of 1.12 hours, and a mean time of 20.0 hours.
EasyList contributors. Contributors add rules to EasyList in
two ways. First, potential contributors propose changes in the
EasyList forum.15 Second, contributors can post issues on the
EasyList Github repository.
15https://forums.lanik.us/
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Figure 2: Evolution of the number of rules in EasyList. Over a
9-year period, EasyList grew by more than 70,000 rules.
Though more than 6,000 members are registered on the
EasyList forum, we find that only a small number of indi-
viduals decide what is added to the project. The five most
active contributors are responsible for 72,149 of the 93,858
(76.87%) commits and changes. Figure 3 shows a bar chart
of the number of commits per author of EasyList.
Lifetime of EasyList rules. Figure 4 presents the distribution
of the lifetime of rules in EasyList. The figure considers
only rules that were removed during the project’s history. Put
differently, the figure shows how much time passed between
when a rule was added to EasyList, and when it was removed,
for the subset of rules that have been removed. We observe
that 50% of the rules stayed more than 3.8 years (45.5 months)
in EasyList before being removed.
4 Applying EasyList to the Web
This section quantifies which EasyList rules are triggered in
common browsing patterns. We conducted this measurement
by applying EasyList to 10,000 websites every day for two
months, and recording which rules were triggered, and how
often.
This section first presents the methodology of a longitu-
dinal, online study of a large number of websites. We then
present the results of this measurement. We find that over
90% of rules in EasyList are never used. We also show that
on average, 29.8 rules were added to the list every day, but
that these new rules tend to be less used than rules that have
been in EasyList for a long time.
The section concludes by categorizing and counting the
ways advertisers react to new EasyList rules. We detect more
than 2,000 situations where URLs are changed to evade rules
and present a taxonomy of observed evasion strategies.
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Figure 3: Distribution of the number of commits per author in Ea-
syList. 32 authors (65.3%) made less than 100 commits, while 13
(28.3%) made more than 1,000 commits.
Measurement Counts
# days 74
# domains 10,000
# non-responsive domains 400
Avg # pages per day 29,776
Avg # pages per domain per day 3.74
Total # pages measured 3,260,479
Table 1: Statistics of the number of domains and sites measured
during online EasyList measurement.
4.1 Methodology
Crawl description. To understand the usefulness of rules in
EasyList, we applied EasyList to 10,000 websites every day
for over two months (74 days). We selected these 10,000
websites from two groups:
1. Popular websites: Websites from the top 5K Alexa, a
ranking of sites online by popularity.
2. Unpopular websites: 5,000 websites randomly selected
from the top Alexa one-million, but not present in the
set of popular websites. (i.e. rank 5,001–1 million)
We crawled the web using an instrumented version of
Chromium to measure which filter rules were applicable when
browsing a large number of websites in an anonymous brows-
ing scenario. The crawls were launched from AWS Lambda
instances located in the us-east-1 region. We provide the
code of the Lambda function on Github16.
For each day of the experiment, we first visit the landing
page of each URL in the popular and unpopular sets. We then
16https://github.com/anonymsubmissions/usenixlambda
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Figure 4: Cumulative distribution function of the lifetime of the
rules in EasyList. Half of the rules stay more than 3.8 years in
EasyList.
randomly selected up to three URLs referenced in anchor
tags, pointing to pages on the eTLD+1 domain, and visit
these URLs. This resulted in between 10,000 and 40,000
pages being measured every day. Table 1 provides high level
statistics of these measurements.
We use the Chrome devtools protocol 17 to record the fol-
lowing information about each network request made during
page execution:
• Time of the request
• URL of the request
• URL of the domain that initiated the request
• Type of resource fetched (e.g. image, script, sub-
documents)
• Hash of the response
• Size of the response
We note that these measurements do not consider “element”
(i.e. hiding) rules in EasyList. This work focuses only on “net-
work” rules, since “network” rules (potentially) provide pri-
vacy and performance improvements, while “element” rules
provide only cosmetic improvements.
To avoid introducing side effects, we did not block any
requests during our measurements. We instead first recorded
all HTTP requests made when interacting with each site. Next,
we applied EasyList offline using Brave’s ad-blocker NodeJS
module 18. We determine if each request would have been
blocked, excepted, or allowed. A “blocked” request is one
that matches an EasyList network rule, indicating that the
17https://chromedevtools.github.io/devtools-protocol/
18https://github.com/brave/ad-block
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resource should not be fetched. An “excepted” request is one
that matches a blocking rule, but also matches a “excepting”
rule, indicating that the resource should be fetched anyway.
An “allowed” request matches no EasyList rules.
Description of the dataset. Our dataset comprises every net-
work request made during our crawl of 10,000 websites, for
74 days between July 24th, 2018 and October 5th, 2018.
Among the 10,000 websites crawled daily, 400 (4.0%) never
responded during the experiment. We attribute this to a mix of
websites becoming inactive (common among unpopular web-
sites [19]) and websites blocking IP addresses belonging to
AWS to deter crawlers. The existence of such AWS-including
IP blacklists has been documented in other work [7]. We
discuss possible limitations to our study more in Section 6.
4.2 Results
Proportion of EasyList rules used. We consider a rule as
used during a crawl if the rule matched at least one network
request made during the crawl. We measure the proportion
of network and exception rules used during our crawls. We
focus on network rules, as opposed to element (hiding) rules
because network rules impact performance and privacy. We
find that the vast majority of network and exception rules are
never used. Only 9.84% (4,038) of rules were used even once
during our measurements.
An even smaller number of network and exception rules are
frequently used. On average, only 5.14% of EasyList network
and exception rules were used at least once per day (Research
Question 4). We also observed that the number of active rules
is stable over time (Research Question 2).
Figure 5 shows the cumulative distribution function of
how often filter rules were used during the 74 days of the
experiment. The distribution is skewed; the majority of
rules are either not used (90.16%), or were used between 1
and 100 times (4.45%). Only 3.56% of the rules were used
between 100 and 1,000 times, and 1.83% more than 1000
times.
Usefulness of EasyList additions. During the experiment,
2,202 network and exception rules were added to EasyList,
an average of 29.8 new rules per day (Research Question 1).
We refer to rules added to EasyList during our measurement
campaign as new; we call rules old if they existed in EasyList
at the start of the measurement period.
The vast majority of rules, new and old, were not used dur-
ing our measurements. Of the 2,202 rules added during the
study period, 208 (9.45%) were used at least once. Those mea-
surements are roughly similar for old rules (9.84%). However,
when considering only rules that were used at least once, we
found that new rules were used nearly an order of magnitude
less than old rules. This suggests a declining marginal useful-
ness per rule as EasyList accumulates more rules, possibly
because the most troublesome resources are already blocked.
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Figure 5: Distribution of the number of times rules are used during
the 74 days of the experiment.
If a new rule was used during the study, it was used an aver-
age of 0.65 times per day. Old rules were applied much more
frequently, 6.14 times a day on average.
Impact of the age of rules. We also measure whether the age
of a rule impacts its use. We find that the age of a rule signifi-
cantly impacts the number of times rules are used. We present
these findings in two ways: graphically and statistically.
Figure 6 presents the distribution of the age of the rules
present in EasyList, as well as the average number of uses
depending on the age of a rule. The distribution of the age
of the rules (black bars) shows that there are rules from all
ages in EasyList. The important number of 5-year-old rules is
explained by the merge of the "Fanboy’s list", another popular
filter list, with EasyList in 2013. If we observe the average
number of times rules are used in a day (grey bars), we see that
the most useful rules are old. This is caused by some really
generic rules blocking URLs that contained keywords such as
"ads" or popular domains such as doubleclick.net. For ex-
ample, the rule .com/ads/$image,object,subdocument
has been added to EasyList in September 2010 and has been
used 748,330 times during the experiment. We also observe
that there is no simple linear relationship between the average
use of a rule and its age.
Besides the graphical analysis, we also conduct statistic
tests to determine whether the age of a rule impact its use. We
use the Kolmogorov-Smirnov test to compare the distribution
of the number of times rules are used depending on the du-
ration they have been present in EasyList. For each year yi
between 1 and 8, we compare the distribution of the number
of times rules that have been present yi years in EasyList have
been used with:
1. the distribution of the number of times rules that have
been present less than one year,
2. the distribution of the number of times rules that have
been present between yi−1 and yi years.
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Figure 6: The black bars represent the distribution of the age of the
rules present in EasyList. The grey bars represent the average time a
rule is used per day against the time it has been added to EasyList.
For all the tests, we obtain p-values < 10−5, which indi-
cates that there are significant differences in the way rules are
used depending on their age (Research Question 3).
4.3 Advertiser Reactions
EasyList helps users avoid online advertising. Advertisers
and websites that rely on advertising for their income do not
want their content to be blocked and may try to circumvent
rules in EasyList. There are several ways an advertiser may
do this. One option is to try to detect the use of an adblock-
ing tool [8]. Alternatively, the advertiser may manipulate the
URLs that serve their content, to prevent matching filter rules.
In this section, we measure how often, and in which ways,
advertisers responded to EasyList rules. We do not observe a
statistically significant reaction by advertisers in general but
we note common patterns in avoidance strategies among a
subset of advertisers.
Advertiser Reactions To New Rules. We first measured
whether advertisers in general respond to being blocked in
EasyList. We did not find a statistically significant reaction
overall (meaning that most blocked-content-hosters do not
seem to respond to relevant rules being added to EasyList), but
find interesting commonalities among the subset of blocked-
content-hosters that do respond.
We designed this measure on the following intuition: if a
resource changed URL more frequently after being blocked
by EasyList than before, it would suggest an advertiser try-
ing to evade EasyList. Similarly, if the number of times a
resource was blocked spiked after the EasyList addition, and
then reverted to its pre-rule block-rate, that would also suggest
advertiser evasion.
We tested this intuition through the following steps. First,
we considered only rules that were added during the measure-
ment period, and which remained in EasyList for at least 14
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Figure 7: Number of times resources are blocked or allowed after a
rule is added to EasyList
days. Second, we identified resources that were blocked by
these new rules and looked to see if the same resource (as
determined by the content’s hash), was served by different
URLs during the study. Third, we filtered out resources that
were less than 50KB, to avoid resources that were trivially
identical, like common logos and tracking pixels. Fourth, we
measured whether the number of URLs a resource was served
from changed significantly before and after being blocked by
EasyList.
Figure 7 presents the block and allow rates for resources
affected by new rules. We did not find any population-wide
trends of advertisers modifying URLs to avoid EasyList. As
shown on the graph, adding a new EasyList rule increased
how often affected resources were blocked (by definition). If
advertisers were, in general, successfully evading EasyList,
we would observe a decrease in blocking over time. Block
rates did not, in general, revert to pre-rule levels over time.
Advertiser Reactions To Old Rules. We also measured
whether we could observe advertisers evading rules that ex-
isted in EasyList before the start of our study. We were able
to identify many such evasions, but are unable to measure
the significance of such observations, since we do not have
historical records of block and allow rates for these resources.
We measured advertisers reactions to old rules by looking
for instances of the following pattern:
1. A third-party resource is referenced by a first-party do-
main, and that third-party resource is blocked by an Ea-
syList rule.
2. Later, the same third-party resource (determined by the
response hash) is referenced by the same first-party do-
main, at least two times, and the resource is fetched from
a different URL that is not blocked by EasyList.
We observed this pattern 1,927 times, where 773 different
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Figure 8: Number of times each strategy has been used during
the experiment. The "change domain" strategy does not include
resources that were moved to first party.
domains changed the URLs for 947 difference resources to
avoid EasyList rules (Research Question 5).
4.4 Evasion Strategies
In this subsection, we present a partial taxonomy of the strate-
gies used by advertisers to avoid EasyList rules. Figure 8
presents the number of times each evasion strategy was ob-
served during the experiment.
Changing Domains. Many advertisers changed the domains
their resources were served from, either by subtly modifying
the domain names or by completely changing them through
domain generation algorithm style techniques. This happened
1,612 times and does not take into account resources that were
moved to the first party. For example, the URL https://c.
betrad.com/geo/ba.js?r170201 was blocked by the rule
||betrad.comˆ$third-party. The resource was moved to
a new domain, c.evidon.com, to avoid being blocked.
In total, resources were moved from 100 distinct domains
to 157 distinct domains, representing a total of 195 distinct
combinations of domains. The two most frequent transitions
are resources moved from pagead2.googlesyndication.
com to google.com and from cs03.etcodes.com to cs03.
et-cod.com. The former occurred 499 times and the lat-
ter 185 times. Concerning the latter, requests originat-
ing from cs03.etcodes.com were blocked by the rule
||etcodes.comˆ$third-party. We observe that the adver-
tiser changed the domain that served the resources so that it
looks the same when observed by a human but that does not
match the filter anymore.
Moving Resources to the First Party. Advertisers avoided
EasyList rules by moving resources from third-party domains
to the first party. It happened 84 times, among which 23 times
resources were moved to another sub-domain of the first party.
For example, we observed the domain cnn.com including re-
sources from ssl.cdn.turner.com, which was blocked by
the rule ||turner.comˆ*/ads/. We then observed the same
resource being served from cdn.cnn.com directly, which pre-
vented the resource from matching the ||turner.com do-
main in the filter rule.
Removing Ad Keywords from URLs. Keywords such as
‘ads’ or ‘ad’ may trigger filter rules. We observed 73 URLs
where these keywords were simply removed. For example, the
URL https://etherscan.io/images/ad/ubex-20.png
was blocked by the rule /images/ad/*. To bypass the fil-
ter rule, the URL was changed to https://etherscan.io/
images/gen/ubex-20.png.
Removing Image Dimensions from URLs. Some URLs
contain parameters to specify the dimension of the ad ban-
ners. These parameters also trigger filter rules. Advertisers
can evade these rules by removing matching parameters from
URLs. We observed 176 Evasions of this kind. For exam-
ple, https://s0.2mdn.net/dfp/.../lotto_kumulacja_
160x600_009/images/lotto_swoosh.png was blocked by
the rule _160x600_. We observed an advertiser removing
the dimension parameter from their URLs to avoid being
blocked.
5 Applications
The previous section demonstrates that most rules in EasyList
are not useful in common browsing scenarios. These unused
rules provide limited-to-no benefit to users, but they carry a
cost. Unused rules degrade the performance of ad-blockers
by increasing the amount of work that must be performed on
every network request. The end result is wasted resources and
degraded browser performance.
In this section, we propose two practical applications of the
previous sections’ findings. First, we demonstrate the benefits
of an optimized, reduced EasyList on resource constrained
iOS devices. Second, we present a novel EasyList-based fil-
tering strategy targeting desktop extensions, that provides
nearly all of the blocking benefits of full EasyList, but with
significantly improved performance.
5.1 Improving Content Blocking on iOS
We first present how content blocking in iOS differs from con-
tent blocking in other platforms. Then, we run a benchmark
that measures how the size of a filter list impacts the time to
launch a content-blocking application on iOS, and how our
findings could help to decrease this time.
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5.1.1 Overview of Content Blocking on iOS
iOS and Safari use a different strategy for content blocking
than is used by other common OS and browsers 19. In most
other browsers and platforms, ad-blockers receive each re-
quest as an object, containing the URL of the resource being
requested, along with other relevant metadata. The extension
can then apply whatever logic is desired to determine whether
the request should be blocked. In most content blocking sys-
tems, this results in a large number of regular expressions (or
similar text patterns) applied to the URL, along with some
optimization to limit the number of rules that need to be con-
sidered.
iOS and Safari use a different approach, where extensions
filter requests by declaring a static set of rules in a custom
JSON format. This protects the user from malicious exten-
sions (since extensions cannot inject tracking or similar logic
into their extensions), at the cost of requiring all rules be ex-
pressed in a static rule set that is less expressive than the
EasyList format. The result is that EasyList is generally ex-
panded from EasyList’s more compact rule format to a larger
number of iOS-compatible rules.
Limits. There are two relevant limitations in iOS’s blocking
approach. First, iOS enforces a limit of 50K rules, to prevent
extensions from degrading browsing performance. While this
limit is not written in the Apple documentation, the main
ad-blocking applications report on this limit.20 Since Easylist
alone contains 40K network rules, little room is left for other
lists such as EasyPrivacy for further privacy. Thus, if a user
wants to use another list such as EasyPrivacy to improve her
privacy, she cannot use all the rules because of the 50K limit.
Second, iOS compiles these filter rules into a binary format
each time rules are updated. Users cannot use the application
during the compilation. As we show in the benchmark we
conduct, users may have to wait for 14 seconds (or more)
when a list composed of 40K rules is compiled, which sig-
nificantly decreases the user experience. This is particularly
unacceptable when launching an app for the first time when
tricks like background compilation cannot be used to hide the
cost from users.
5.1.2 Benchmark
Approach. Our approach here is to decrease the compilation
cost (and increase the ability of users to include other lists
of rules) on iOS devices by only compiling filter rules that
are likely to be useful, instead of the full set of 40k rules. We
show that reducing EasyList to only its useful rules provides
a dramatically improved initial launch experience for users,
19https://developer.apple.com/documentation/safariservices/creating_a_content_blocker
20https://help.getadblock.com/support/solutions/articles/6000099239-
what-is-safari-content-blocking-, https://www.ublock.org/blog/introducing-
ublock-safari-12/
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Figure 9: Average time to compile a filter list depending on device
and size of the list.
and gives users more flexibility to apply additional blocking
lists.
Evaluation Methodology. We first measure the costs of com-
piling different sizes of filter lists on different popular iOS
devices. We generate lists that contain between 1,000 and
40,000 rules randomly selected from the set of network and
exception rules in EasyList. For each of the lists, we use a
fork of the “ab2cb” library 21 to convert the rules from the
Adblock Plus format to the iOS JSON format. Then, for each
device and each list, we compile each iOS filter list 5 times
and report the average compilation time.
Results. Figure 9 shows the average compilation time for
each device and each selected list size. The figure shows
that for a given device, the compilation times grows linearly
with respect to the number of rules. While on average it
takes 0.24 second to compile a list composed of 1,000 rules
on an iPhone X, it grows to 7.4 seconds for a list composed
of 40,000 rules.
Device kind also impacts compilation time. For example,
compiling 40k rules on an iPhone 6s takes, on average, 11.62s,
or 7 seconds longer than on an iPhone X.
Thus, keeping only active rules has two main benefits in
the case of ad-blockers running on iOS and Safari. First, it
allows users to enjoy the benefits of EasyList while remain-
ing well under the platform’s 50K rule-limit. And second, it
dramatically decreases the required compilation time for the
first time the application is launched.
5.2 Improving ad-blocking performance
In this section, we leverage the fact the most of the EasyList
rul s are unused to propose a filtering strategy that provides
nearly all of the blocking benefits of traditional ad-blockers
21https://github.com/brave/ab2cb
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while improving the time to filter requests. We describe our
technique in three steps. First, we describe how current tools
use EasyList for blocking (treating AdBlock Plus, the most
popular of such tools 22, as representative of extensions using
EasyList). Second, we present a straw-man blocking strategy
that only applies frequently used filter rules. Third, we pro-
pose a novel hybrid strategy, that achieves nearly the accuracy
of existing techniques, with the performance improvements
of the straw-man strategy.
The section concludes with an evaluation of the three above
strategies on a representative sample of the web. We find that
our novel hybrid approach achieves over 99% of the cover-
age of the current most popular EasyList tool, but performs
62.5% faster. Because of the nature of the optimizations in
this hybrid strategy, we expect it could be applied to other
EasyList consuming tools to achieve similar performance
improvements.
5.2.1 Existing and Proposed Blocking Strategies
This subsection presents three strategies for applying EasyList
to the web. The first strategy is based on how existing Ea-
syList based filters work. The second strategy only applies
the subset of EasyList that is likely to be useful to users (as
determined by the measurements in Section 4). Rather than a
potential candidate for implementation, this best effort strat-
egy is included as an upper bound of attainable performance.
Finally, we describe a novel blocking strategy that approxi-
mates both the full coverage of the existing strategy and the
upper bound on performance from the second strategy.
Strategy One: Synchronous Full EasyList. Current Ea-
syList tools decide whether a network request should be
allowed by checking the URL of the request (along with
some other information, such as the type of resource being
requested) against every “network” rule in EasyList. More
specifically, these tools follow the following steps.
1. Use hardcoded heuristics, such as not blocking top-level
documents or requests coming from non-web protocols.
If any of these heuristics match, allow the request.
2. Check the requested URL against the small number
“exception” rules in EasyList. If any “exception” rules
match, allow the request.
3. See if the requested URL matches any of the “network”
rules in EasyList. If any “network” rule matches, block
the request.
4. Otherwise, allow the request.
We note two performance impacting aspects of this strategy.
First, it performs a large number of unnecessary computation,
since every “exception” and “network” rule in EasyList is
22https://data.firefox.com/dashboard/usage-behavior
applied to outgoing request, even though the vast majority
(over 90.16%) are very unlikely to be useful (again, based
on the measurements described in Section 4). Second, this
wasteful computation adds delay to a time-sensitive part of
the system. These filter checks are conducted synchronously,
blocking all outgoing network requests until all EasyList rules
are considered.
Strategy Two: Synchronous Reduced List. Next, we de-
scribe a straw-man evaluation strategy, that improves per-
formance by only considering the 9.84% of rules expected
to be useful. This strategy is otherwise identical to strategy
one and differs only in the number of EasyList rules consid-
ered. Instead of applying all of EasyList’s 38,710 “network”
and “exception” rules, this strategy only evaluates the 4,038
rules observed during the online measurements discussed in
Section 4. The expected trade-off here is performance for
coverage since resources that match rarely used filters will be
allowed.
Strategy Three: Synchronous Reduced List, Asyn-
chronous Complementary List. Finally, we present our pro-
posed blocking strategy, a hybrid strategy that achieves nearly
the coverage that full EasyList provides while achieving the
performance improvements of the reduced list. Figure 10
provides an overview of the hybrid strategy.
This strategy uses two steps:
1. A synchronous, request-time matcher, that operates be-
fore each request is issued, but with a reduced version
of EasyList.
2. An asynchronous background matcher, that applies the
uncommon-tail of EasyList, but only when a request has
been allowed by the previous step.
The first step is identical to strategy two. Every outgoing net-
work request is intercepted and blocked until the frequently-
used subset of EasyList rules is considered. The step’s goal
is to minimize how long network requests are blocked, by
minimizing the amount of synchronous work. The result is
that benign network requests complete more quickly than in
strategy one (e.g. current blocking tools).
The second step applies the remaining, long-tail of Ea-
syList rules, but at a less performance-sensitive moment. If
a network request is allowed by the first step, the request is
issued, but the browser continues checking the now-issued
URL against the rest of EasyList. This continued checking is
done asynchronously so that it has minimal effect on the load
time of the page.
If the asynchronous checker finds any rules that match the
URL of the now-issued request, that rule is added to the set
of rules applied by the synchronous matcher so that it will be
quickly blocked in the future.
The result of this hybrid strategy is that commonly blocked
requests are blocked quicker (because the synchronous block-
ing step is considering a smaller rule set), benign requests
10
Module 1 (sync) 
Module 2 (async) 
True
Is request
allowed?
Request
Browser
Website
server
Send request
Transmit rule 
to update filter list
Is module 1
correct?
Web Worker
False
Figure 10: Overview of the proposed hybrid strategy.
complete faster (again, because of the reduced rule list used
in the synchronous blocker), and rare-but-undesirable URLs
are adjusted to (because the asynchronous matcher moves
matching filter rules into the synchronously-applied set).
5.2.2 Evaluation Methodology
In this section, we present a methodology for comparing the
performance and blocking coverage of different EasyList ap-
plication strategies. The goal of this methodology is to un-
derstand how accuracy and performance trade off against
each other and to empirically compare the above-mentioned
strategies.
We implemented each of the above strategies in the version
AdBlock Plus for Chrome available on Github 23 as of July
5th, 2018. In all strategies, we instrumented AdBlock Plus to
measure the amount of time needed to evaluate each outgoing
network request against EasyList (or the relevant subset of
EasyList). For the hybrid approach, we also added timing
measurements to the asynchronous step.
We evaluated each of the three blocking strategies against
the same selection of popular and unpopular websites dis-
cussed in Section 4. As before, these websites are intended to
represent both the most common websites users interact with,
and the less popular websites in the web’s long tail.
We conduct the crawl on an AWS T2 medium instance
with 2 virtual CPUs and 4GB of RAM. Since Chromium does
not support extensions in headless mode, 24 we use stock
Chromium rendered with XVFB, and automated the system
23https://github.com/adblockplus/adblockpluschrome
24https://bugs.chromium.org/p/chromium/issues/detail?id=706008
with the Puppeteer library 25. All experiments were conducted
with caching disabled.
For each of the three strategies, we visited each of the 10K
websites in our sample. We allowed each website five seconds
to respond and then allowed each website to execute for two
seconds. The extension measures the time taken by AdBlock
Plus (modified or stock) to decide whether to block each
network request on each page.
5.2.3 Performance of Blocking Strategies
Table 2 presents the results of applying the above evaluation
methodology against each of the three blocking strategies.
The first row presents measurements for the stock AdBlock
Plus implementation, which uses a synchronous blocking
strategy for all of EasyList. Unsurprisingly, this strategy takes
the longest time of the three to determine whether to block
a network request, 0.56 ms on average, with a median time
of 0.30 ms and a 90th percentile of 0.50 ms. We note that this
time is spent blocking each network request, which greatly
impacts page load time.
The second row shows the performance of the second strat-
egy; reducing EasyList to its most frequently used rules, and
applying that reduced list synchronously. The result of this
strategy is faster performance, but with a non-trivial number
of false positives and false negatives occurring during block-
ing. Requests are decided in 0.19 ms on average, with faster
median and 90th percentile times. The tradeoff is that block-
ing accuracy is reduced. The number of network requests
blocked goes up, as a result of some “exception” rules being
removed from the EasyList set. Similarly, privacy is reduced,
as nearly 18,000 more third-parties are contacted during the
evaluation, a result of some “network” rules missing in the
reduced EasyList set that would have been useful.
Finally, the third through fifth rows present the evaluation
of the hybrid strategy. Rows four and five give measurements
of the synchronous and asynchronous modules of the hybrid
strategy separately, while row three presents the combined
effect. The most significant results of our evaluation are the
following.
First, the synchronous module takes 0.21 ms on average to
process a request. Thus, perceived blocking time is reduced
(compared to stock AdBlock Plus) by 62.5% (Research
Question 6). Second, the hybrid strategy provides blocking
coverage nearly identical to stock AdBlock Plus (> 99%),
with only 138 false negatives on 10,000 websites visited.
The 48 “exception” rule errors do not impact the user since
the rules that would have been excepted were not added to
EasyList. Third, the evaluation shows the adaptive benefit of
the hybrid model. The hybrid approach initially applied 3,259
rules synchronously, but after the 10,000 site evaluation, 186
rules from the uncommon asynchronous set were added to
the synchronous set.
25https://github.com/GoogleChrome/puppeteer
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Strategy Num rulesstart
Num rules
end
Median eval time
per request (ms)
90th time
per request (ms)
Num requests
blocked
Num requests
exceptioned
Num 3rd parties
contacted
Num total
requests
(1) Easylist sync 39,132 39,132 0.30 0.50 30,149 11,905 322,604 748,237
(2) Reduced list sync 3,259 3,259 0.10 0.30 30,611 2,508 340,301 774,473
(3) Hybrid combined 39,132 39,132 0.30 0.60 31,584 14,444 338,841 770,729
(3.1) Hybrid sync 3,259 3,445 0.20 0.30 31,446 14,396 - -
(3.2) Hybrid async 35,873 35,687 0.20 0.30 138 48 - -
Table 2: Performance and coverage comparison for three EasyList application strategies.
Finally, we note the finding that the asynchronous por-
tion of the hybrid approach applies its 35K rules faster
than the reduced-list synchronous approach, which considers
only 3,259 rules. This surprising observation is explained by
the synchronous portion of the hybrid approach doing some
work (e.g. what kind of resource is being fetched) that can be
reused in the asynchronous step.
Overall, we find that the hybrid approach is a successful,
performant strategy, especially when compared to current
popular blocking tools. By building on the findings discussed
in previous sections, the hybrid strategy is able to consider
only the subset of EasyList that is likely to be useful in the
performance critical path and can put off evaluating EasyList’s
to when it is less performance impacting. Further, the hybrid
approach achieves these performance improvements with a
minimal effect on blocking accuracy.
6 Limitations
The findings in this study depend on having a sample of the
web that generalizes to the types of websites users visit and
spend time on. We treat the Alexa 5K, along with a sampling
of less popular websites, as representative of typical browsing
patterns. While we expect this set to be a good representative
of the web as a whole (largely because the highly skewed
distribution of website popularity means the most popular
sites represent the majority of most user’s browsing time), we
note it here as a possible limitation.
Similarly, our results may not generalize to localities that
are not well represented by the Alexa global rankings. Re-
producing our crawl methodology in sites more popular in
those regions would be a necessary step to generate locally
applicable results.
All of our results were generated from automated crawls,
which also may have affected how generalizable our results
are. It is possible that different kinds of resources are fetched
and so different parts of EasyList are used, when users in-
teract with websites in particular ways, such as logging in
or using web-app like functionality. How generalizable auto-
mated crawl results are to the browsing experiences of real
users is a frequently acknowledged issue in measurement stud-
ies (e.g. [20]), and one we hope the community can address
with future work.
Additionally, all crawling done in this work was carried
out from well known AWS IP addresses. This means that
the results may be affected by the kinds of anti-crawling
techniques sometimes deployed against Amazon IP addresses.
This, in turn, could have affected the number and distribution
of ads observed during measurement. While this is a common
limitation of this kind of web-scale measurement, we note it
as another limitation of the work.
Finally, our results consider every blocking action as
equally useful. In our measurements, a rule that blocks ten
resources is implicitly ten times more useful than a rule that
only blocks one request. It is possible, though, that a less
frequently used rule may be more beneficial to the user than a
frequently used rule if the infrequently blocked rule is block-
ing a very malicious or performance harming resource. We
acknowledge this limitation, but treat the question of “how
beneficial is it to the user to block a given resource” beyond
the scope of this work.
7 Related work
Online tracking. Recent studies document a growth of third-
party tracking on the web [2, 11]. Yu et al. [23] found an
increase in analytics services and social widgets. Englehardt
et al [2] showed tracking code on more than 10% of the web-
sites of the top Alexa 1M. Libert et al [13] showed that 180k
pages of the top 1M Alexa websites had cookies spawned by
the DoubleClick domain, a behavioral advertising company.
Defenses against tracking. The NoScript extension 26 en-
ables to prevent JavaScript execution. While this approach
blocks trackers, it also breaks websites that use JavaScript
for legitimate purposes. This trade-off between privacy and
usability is important. Yu et al. [23] find that privacy tools that
break legitimate websites may lead to users deactivating such
tools, harming user privacy. The most popular kind of tracking
protection is browser extensions such as Ghostery, Disconnect
or uBlock origin, as well as browsers such as Brave or Safari
that enable to block third-party requests.
26https://noscript.net/
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A variety of strategies have been proposed for identify-
ing unwanted web resources. Privacy Badger uses a learning-
based approach. Iqbal et al. [9] also proposed a machine learn-
ing approach that considers features extracted from HTML
elements, HTTP requests, and JavaScript to determine if a
request should be blocked. Storey et al. [21] propose a visual
recognition approach targeting legally mandated advertising
identifiers. Yu et al [23] proposed a crowdsourced approach
where users collectively identify data elements that could be
used to uniquely identify users. The majority of anti-tracking
and ad-blocking tools rely on filter lists.
Different studies [3, 18] show that tracker blockers and ad-
blockers are popular among the general population. Malloy et
al [14] showed that depending on the country, between 16%
and 37% of the Internet users had an ad-blocker installed.
Mathur et al [15] found that most users of anti-tracking tools
use the tools to avoid advertising.
Effectiveness of anti-tracking tools. Gervais et al. [5] quan-
tified the privacy provided by the main ad-blockers. They
show that on average, using an ad-blocker with the default con-
figuration reduce the number of third parties loaded by 40%.
Merzdovnik et al. [16] showed that rule-based approaches can
outperform Privacy Badger’s learning-based approach. They
also show that extensions that rely on community-based lists
are less effective than extensions based on proprietary lists
such as Disconnect or Ghostery when used with the correct
settings. Their study demonstrates that besides blocking track-
ers, most of these extensions have a negligible CPU overhead.
In some cases, it even leads to a decrease in the overall CPU
usage of the browser.
Maintaining filter lists. In order to keep up with new do-
mains creating and domains changing their behavior, it is
crucial to maintain filter lists. Because it is a cumbersome
task and it needs to be done carefully not to break websites,
Gugelmann et al. [6] proposed an automated approach that re-
lies on a set of web traffic features to identify privacy invasive
services and thus help developers maintaining filter lists.
Researchers have documented several strategies that ad-
vertisers use to evade blocking strategies. Wang et al [22]
found advertisers randomizing HTML identifiers and struc-
ture. Facebook has applied this technique as well [1]. Ad-
versity has also been discussed by recent studies on anti-ad-
blockers [8,17,25], i.e. scripts whose purpose is to detect and
block ad-blockers to deliver advertising to more users. Iqbal
et al. [8] conducted a retrospective measurement study of anti
ad-block filter lists using the Wayback machine. They applied
the Anti-Adblock Killer List, the most active anti ad-blocker
list, on historical snapshots of Alexa top-5K, and measured
that the list triggers only on 8.7% of the websites. They also
show that similarly to EasyList, these anti ad-block lists keep
growing over time. While their approach enables detection
of advertisers that asks users to deactivate their ad-blockers
to show them ads, the approach we propose in Section 4.3
focuses on advertisers that bypass filter rules stealthily, i.e.
without interacting with the users.
8 Conclusion
This paper studies EasyList, the most popular filter list used
for blocking advertising and tracking related content on the
web. We find that the vast majority of rules in EasyList are
rarely, if ever, used in common browsing scenarios. We mea-
sure the number of these “dead weight” rules, and effect on
browser performance, through comparison with alternative,
data-driven EasyList application strategies. We find that by
separating the wheat from the chaff, and identifying the small
subset of EasyList filter rules that provide common benefit
for users, EasyList’s benefits can be efficiently enjoyed on
performance constrained mobile devices. We also use these
findings to propose an alternate blocking strategy on desktops
that improves performance by 62.5%, while capturing over
> 99% of the benefit of EasyList.
More broadly, we hope this work will inform how similar
crowdsourced security and privacy tools are developed and
maintained. As previous work [10] has identified, such lists
tend to accumulate cruft as they accumulate new rules. Over
time, the benefit of such tools risks being outweighed by the
amount of dead weight pulled with them. We hope the findings
in this work highlight the need for regular pruning of these
lists, to keep them lean and as helpful to users as possible.
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